Chapter Four
Ottoman Empire - The Sick Man of Europe

Even recognizing the serious problems and underlying strains visible in Russia by the end of the 19th century, the political power most dramatically and destructively influenced by the many revolutionary forces dominating the 19th century was the Ottoman Empire.  The Ottoman Empire has always had a unique status in Europe.  On one hand, it was one of the major powers impacting European balance of power for centuries.  Ottoman leaders created their empire at the same time as Austria and Russia, expanding from its home base in Turkey in the 14th century, and reaching its peak of control in the 17th century. The empire encompassed territory in the Mediterranean, North Africa, the Near East and Europe, specifically the Balkans and Southeast Europe.  These territorial holdings translated into control of key sea-based trading connections specifically in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Black Sea.  As the major land power controlling strategic connections between Europe, Asia and Africa, the Ottoman Empire had for centuries derived tremendous wealth and influence. See map This much-envied control constantly brought the Ottoman empire into competition and often armed conflict with other European powers including the Italian state of Venice in the 15th century, Spain in the 16th century, and by the 18th - 19th centuries, a constant state of tension existed with neighboring empires of Austria and Russia.  Based on its control of the key strategic territories of SE Europe, the Ottoman Empire was an important participant in the European balance of power system. see map

 

On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire was dramatically different from all other European powers in culture and political traditions.  Most obviously and significantly, the Ottoman was an Islamic power and did not share the characteristic of Christian-based culture (whether Catholic, Orthodox or Protestant) that tied the rest of Europe together.  In addition, the system of rule by Sultans, while it mirrored some of the harsher aspects of European absolutism, owed much more to Near Eastern and Asia political traditions of Arab Caliphates and Persian palace politics.

 

Thus, the Ottoman Empire was and was not part of the European world, depending on ones perspective and the specific measure being used.  Interestingly, this kind of question of what constitutes being part of “Europe” continues to echo in the current, often quite emotional debates occurring over the possible inclusion of Turkey into the European Union – one sees the same kind of divide between those who see Turkey as part of the trade and geopolitical interests of Europe, and those who convey hostility and opposition, pointing to these religious divisions and cultural differences.

Certainly, in the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was an integral part of Europe in geopolitical terms – a key link in trade connections with Africa and the East, and a full participant in the geopolitical calculations, warfare and alliances that made up the balance of power system. The Ottoman Empire was also fully a part of the European experience as its leaders found themselves under assault from challenges fueled by the revolutionary influences of industrialization, liberalism and that most pervasive force - fervent nationalism.

 

CRIMEAN WAR

 

The Ottoman Empire, like Austria and Russia, did not actively pursue the path of modernization and industrialization in the early decades of the 19th century.  Complacency and a trust in the continued strength of agriculture and trade routes meant the Ottoman Empire leaders did not recognize the threat inherent in the economic changes occurring in parts of Europe.  This translated clearly into declining economic power as steamships enabled a global trade that largely bypassed traditional Mediterranean and Silk Road routes and cut deeply into Ottoman tax revenues.  More significantly, the Ottoman Empire did not keep pace with military advances resulting from industrialization and resulting weakness became markedly apparent during the crisis that expanded into the Crimean War.  This conflict made glaringly apparent the relative weakness of the Ottoman Empire in relation to the industrial powers of Britain and France. We discuss this war as part of the larger story of key developments in European diplomatic relations next week; this war was clearly the beginning of the end for the Ottoman Empire.

The Crimean conflict began as a clash between two non-industrial dinosaurs: the Ottoman state and Tzarist Russia.  Conflicting over competing interests in the Balkans (Russia wanting to move in) and religious hatreds between the Islamic Ottoman Empire and Orthodox Christian Russia, tensions escalated into the Crimean War in 1853. The war (1853 – 1856) broadened, however, when Britain and France joined as allies; interestingly, they supported not Christian Russia but rather allied with the Ottoman Empire, clearly practicing the art of balance of power and siding against what they perceived as the greater threat – a Russian empire with a direct link to the Mediterranean.  (see map)

 

With the aid of monies, weapons and industrial military support from these two powers, the Ottoman Empire was on the winning side.  However, the Ottoman leaders then found themselves with British/ French troops stationed in their territories; a powerful, industrialized presence by countries that had no intention of leaving. Britain and France used troops now stationed in Ottoman territory to take over valuable regions. France moved into North Africa (Morocco and Algeria).  Great Britain secured power over Egypt - and ultimately gained control of the strategically invaluable Suez Canal being built there.

 

In addition to the loss of valuable territories, Ottoman leaders found themselves deeply in debt to these two powers as a result of the war, a debt that simply could not be repaid.  Such debt meant vulnerability and submission to British and French economic and political pressure and demands.  For example, Britain and France demanded the elimination of trade barriers, forcing the Ottoman to open its borders to virtually unrestricted Western goods.  Mass produced goods flooded Ottoman markets, completely swamping and eroding local, hand-crafted industries. The Ottoman Empire continued to suffer from this debt, economic vulnerability and increasing weakness throughout the rest of the century.

 

BALKAN DIVERSITY

 

The most serious and ultimately costliest force of change faced by the Ottoman leadership was nationalism.  Arguably no state so clearly fit the definition of multicultural empire as the Ottoman, encompassing as it did dozens of national groups in North Africa, the many diverse peoples of the Near East, and that hotbed of cultural diversity, the Balkans.

 

The Balkans, the Southeast corner of Europe extending into the Mediterranean, is a fascinating region historically, culturally and politically, due to its position as a crossroads between Europe, Asia and Africa.  For millennium, different peoples from all directions settled in or crossed over this land link between the civilizations of three continents.  Migrating groups and invading empires continually brought in new peoples and cultural influences.  The fact that this region is dominated by mountains and significant natural barriers meant that the different groups and cultural blends settling in this region developed largely as separate communities, divided from each other into fiercely independent pockets and regional states, producing a staggering degree of diversity in languages, culture and traditions in a relatively small amount of territory. 

 

The Balkans region was and is one of the most culturally diverse stretches of territory in Europe, or the globe for that matter, in terms of different cultures, languages and religions.  In the 19th century (and to today), this translated into many different groups increasingly identifying themselves as ‘nations’, and many of these nations seeking to break free of Ottoman rule.   Most of these cultural groups defined themselves and highlighted their distinction from their neighbors based on two major factors - language and religion. The Balkans is home to Croats, Slovenes, Romanians, Hungarians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Greeks, Serbians, Bosnians, Albanians, Bulgarians, Dalmatians, Transylvanians, Moldavians and the Roma (Gypsy) nation. And this list does not include smaller linguistic groups and even more localized regional identities in this complex corner of Europe. Despite centuries of interaction and merging of populations, cultural / linguistic diversity remained intact and now became the bases for conflict among growing nationalist movements.  Further complicating relations were religions differences between ‘national’ groups. Balkans cultures or 'nations' were (and to a large extent still are) divided between three major religious groups:

 

Orthodox Christian

Serbians
Macedonians
Greeks
Montenegrins

 

Catholic

Croats
Slovenes
Romanians 

Muslim
Albanians
Bulgarians
Bosnians
Kosovars

See map

 

OTTOMAN RULE


Ottoman policies for the past 400 years of rule in fact exacerbated and intensified these already complex and deeply rooted differences.  Many historians point to the fact that the Ottoman Empire was both too repressive and too lenient in its treatment of non-Turkish and non-Muslim populations.  On one hand, the Ottoman rulers were harsh towards non-Muslims, who lived under heavy restrictions, were limited in their economic possibilities, paid significant ‘religious’ taxes, faced substantive legal discrimination and were reduced to second class citizen status for centuries. This of course created deeply rooted hatreds on the part of Christians and Jews towards Ottoman rulers and Muslims in general.  These historic hostilities laid the seeds for ethnic-religious violence that culminated in the 20th century in horrific episodes such as Orthodox Serbian atrocities against Muslim Bosnians.  The endless cycle of revenge and blood debt in this region based on religious hatreds was certainly intensified by 500 years of Muslim rule and Ottoman policies of discrimination. 

On the other hand, Ottoman leaders were actually too lenient in the eyes of some in that they allowed the continuation of Balkan diversity.  They did not crush, eliminate, assimilate peoples, they did not impose an Ottoman (Turkish, Muslim) identity to replace or supplant Balkans diversity.  While giving preferences to Muslims and placing greater legal and economic burdens on Christians and Jews, they did not implement a policy of wholesale forced conversion.  They let this region remain a confusing mix of disparate linguistic, religious and cultural groups living, uneasily, next to each other.  Thus, this diversity – and historically based angers between nationalists – remained and would come back to not only haunt, but destroy the Ottoman Empire.

 

INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS

 

In the 19th century, nationalist movements in the Balkans erupted into protest and agitation.  The emotional power of nationalist pride and political goals clearly had a strong appeal and power in this multi-cultural empire.  Some of the earliest examples of nationalist wars for independence occurred in Ottoman territory, most famously the bloody but ultimately successful Greek War of Independence (1821-1832).  Ottoman leaders engaged in some of the most savage and draining battles for national autonomy in Europe.  By the end of the century, several new countries were born out of the wreckage of this once intimidating empire. (see map)  New countries in the Balkans, factors that directly affected the geo-political balance of Europe, included: 

  • Montenegro: 1878
  • Romania: 1878
  • Serbia:  gained autonomy in 1829; full independence 1878
  • Bulgaria: 1908
  • Albania: 1912

 

Of course, successful nationalist movements in the Balkans led to the same problem seen in Austria, but at an even deadlier level. There was no possibility of drawing clean lines between nationalist groups in the formation of these new states, so new countries necessarily and immediately had to contend with dissatisfied 'minority' populations in their borders. (see map)  There were also ongoing conflicts over which new state had the better claim to specific Balkan regions, based on the proportional number of 'their' national group living there.  This intractable problem led to violence and warfare in the Balkans at the turn of the 19th/20th century, and has continued to erupt into violence and atrocities throughout the 20th century.  And, of course, these conflicts continued into the late 20th and early 21st centuries, including recent horrors in the war in Bosnia, and the more recent violence in the region of Kosovo which broke away from Serbian control, and the angry protests by Serbs over (and continued resistance to) the loss of part of their 'national' homeland.   (see news links)

 

LIBERALISM

 

Clearly, decades of trying to suppress nationalists exhausted what was already a stagnant empire and the subsequent loss of those territories further depleted Ottoman power.  Criticism within the empire grew, levied at a Sultanate that clearly could not rule effectively, and was unable to secure Ottoman citizens from outside threat or internal violence and loss of territory.  A group calling themselves the Young Turk movement formed secret societies that advocated constitutional changes and modernization of the decrepit Ottoman empire.   Ultimately, these reformers staged a coup in 1908 which end the centuries old dynastic Sultanate, and replacing it with a constitutional monarchy and the initiation of constitutional processes.  However, these more ‘modern’ leaders were intent on preserving what was left of the empire but equally unable to do so; despite important steps towards creating constitutional processes, they were completely unable to stop the decline of the Empire.   In fact, it was this fledgling new leadership that plunged the Ottoman Empire into the Great War in 1914, a war it was completely unprepared to fight and which proved the death blow to its imperial control.

 

SICK MAN OF EUROPE

 

By the end of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was clearly a dying empire.  Though a new leadership tried to break destructive patterns and stifling policies with the overthrow of the Sultanate, this dinosaur state continued to lose ground. It suffered from continued decline of economic wealth and integrity, exacerbated by intrusive and extractive policies by industrialized Britain and France, and the loss of most of the territorial reach of its empire was a source of ongoing humiliation. The decline of the Ottoman Empire, referred to as the ‘Sick Man of Europe’, was well underway by the time of the Crimean War and glaringly apparent as new Balkan states peeled away.  The resulting power vacuum in the Balkan peninsula, recognize, created a new and dangerous situation of geopolitical uncertainty in this tinderbox region - results we develop further in the next Unit on European diplomacy.

 

The problems and instability in Europe resulting from nationalism, in particular the destabilization not just of empires but of the entire diplomatic system of Europe, is the focus of our discussion next Unit.  And nowhere was this destabilization more apparent than in the jostling over power and borders in the Balkans - the tense uncertainty is termed the Eastern Question.  The failure to adequately solve this problem not only led directly to the violence that escalated into the disastrous first WORLD war, but laid the groundwork for ongoing violence, bloodshed, and horrific atrocities up to the present day - the recent episodes of war in the former Yugoslavia, the genocidal violence between Serbia, Bosnia, and the current hot spot region of Kosovo. We pick up the story of diplomatic instability and the road to war in the next Unit.

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