alliances

CHAPTER FOUR: ROAD TO WAR

The critical period of the late 19th and early 20th centuries is intensely studied by historians attempting to understand the factors led to the outbreak of the devastating world war which erupted in 1914. The impact of revolutionary ideologies, shifts in regional power, and a transformation of foreign policy all combined to create the conditions in which a Balkan crisis rapidly expanded into a full fledged European conflict, and ultimately exploded into the first true world war.

END OF THE BALANCE OF POWER

By the beginning of the 20^thcentury, nationalist groups had carved out new borders, given birth to new countries and further complicated relations between European powers. At the same time, the diplomatic system, based on a "balance of power" which had maintained regional stability, was eroding. Recall, after the devastation of the Napoleonic Wars, the major powers of Europe at the Congress of Vienna attempted to create a relative balance of power - one that would prevent any country from becoming too powerful. This balance of power was maintained through continual shifting of territory and forces - through treaties and small wars which kept map makers busy throughout the 19^th century. In addition, to keep each other in check, European states engaged in an ever-shifting alliance system, determining who was a friend or enemy based on the regional power balance at that time. Alliances were therefore flexible, enabling leaders to respond to shifting calculations of power. If one of the countries in Europe was building up too fast and threatening to become too dominant in the region, some or all of the other major powers would ally together to keep that power in check.

This balance of power did not prevent wars; several small wars took place in Europe in the 19th century, for example between Piedmont-Sardinia and Austria, and Germany and France in 1871. The important achievement was this - these border wars did not escalate into a full scale European war, in part because of the relative balance of power, and the common, shared desire to prevent a European-wide conflict.

However, with the rise of nationalist passions and competition, foreign policy and alliances developed that were NOT based on regional stability but rather on the narrow interests and agendas of individual nation-states, for example aggressive actions by Germany and Italy. Nationalism reinforced and fed competition and even hatred between states, which escalated hostilities. Diplomacy was transformed from a rational pursuit of a stable balance of power into what some leaders interpreted as a Darwinian struggle between hostile enemy "nations". Instead of making diplomatic decisions based on maintaining relative regional balance, countries became driven by narrow, competitive, nationalist interests - thus dramatically increasing tensions.

HOSTILE ALLIANCE SYSTEMS

Instead of shifting, alliances were in fact hardening by the late 19th century. By 1882, Germany solidified a strong alliance with Austria-Hungary (led by a German dynasty.) Italy joined in this alliance, in part due to a shared hatred and distrust of France, a classic example of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend". This alignment of the Central Powers in Europe became known as the Triple Alliance. In response, France and Russia moved closer together diplomatically and by 1894, formalized a military and political alliance. By 1907, Britain, fearing isolation and deeply suspicious of Germany, joined France and Russia in what became known as the Triple Entente. Thus, by 1907 European diplomacy was dangerously petrified. Instead of flexible, shifting alliances, Europe's great powers were locked into two hostile alliance blocs. Smaller states were forced to join in one of these alliances for protection. For example Serbia signed a treaty with Russia based on nationalist affiliations. Serbs (then and now) had a close relationship with Russia based on a common Slavic nationality. The hatred Slavic Serbia had for Germanic Austria also made the decision an easy one for Serbia.

A few states confronting tense, difficult geographic locations between two (or more) hostile powers opted for neutrality. Countries like Switzerland could not afford to antagonize any of their powerful neighbors by appearing to be on either side of this emerging confrontation. Belgium (which bordered France and Germany) also sought to solidify its neutral status. In accordance with international law, Belgium signed treaties with all of the major powers, verifying that Belgium would remain neutral in any impending conflict. Each power guaranteed they would respect and protect Belgium's neutral status.

Thus, a complex and entangling system of alliances was in place by 1910 - all of the major powers were locked into concrete alliances, fueled by national hatreds and competition. There was little movement or flexibility left in the diplomatic arena. All that was needed to set this off was for states on either side of these conflicting blocs to go to war; this would drag in everyone else like a series of dominoes. As we will see next week, in the fall of 1914, this is precisely what happened.

Against this backdrop of tense, fixed alliances, there were a number of issues over which European states came into increasing conflict. Economic competition on the seas and in foreign markets escalated, fed by continued industrial growth and colonial competition. Confrontations and wars in colonies necessarily increased the tensions in Europe. In addition, there were hot spots of contested borders and territories in Europe, such as the Alsace Lorraine (taken by Germany in 1871 - the French wanted it back, badly!) and of course the Balkans.

In thinking about European relations in the early 1900's, one should have the sense of a pressure cooker, with the emotional hatred of nationalism turning up the heat. The erosion of a functional balance of power system meant there was no longer any diplomatic focus or even value placed on regional stability. Every state was thinking only of its own needs, and how to increase power and wealth at the expense of its foes. And many leaders felt these gains would require war.

ARMS AND MOBILIZATION RACES

This tightly locked alliance system and sense of impending war led to an active and escalating arms race. All sides were arming, and closely watching those in the "other" alliance. Industrial production and growth increasingly focused on building and improving machine guns, artillery and transportation systems. In fact, an important issue for war planners in the early 20^th century was how to move troops, with all these weapons, as fast as possible to the anticipated front lines. Due to the petrified alliance system, it was clear to leaders what the sides would be once a war broke out, and who would be their "enemy". Therefore, war planning focused on how to move men and supplies to the front line - which was already determined by alliances.

The dominant theory among the military/political leaders throughout Europe was that once war broke out, the country that raced its supplies and men to the front the fastest would win - the emphasis was on offensive policies and rapid mobilization for war. Each country focused on tightly planned mobilization schedules. In particular, counties with very limited railroad systems (such as barely industrialized Russia and Austria) had to meticulously plan how best to use their few rail lines.

The situation in military terms leading up to 1914 was that all the major powers of Europe had war plans and strategies based on mobilizing as fast as possible, and building weapons at an ever increasing pace. Voices calling for disarmament and negotiations were ignored. Thus, when a crisis did break out in June 1914, there was virtually no time for diplomatic resolution - all leaders (political and military) was thinking about mobilization needs, and were most concerned about not being caught napping by their foes. Predictably, once one country started to mobilize, escalation into a full scale regional war occurred within weeks.

ATTITUDES

Finally, another key contributing element to the war about to erupt in 1914 was the attitude towards war. It is hard for us, who have inherited the memory and legacies of two world wars, to imagine but in the early 1900's, mainstream European society was not greatly afraid of war and its costs.

Recognize, (with the exception of the Napoleonic wars) the wars of the 19^th century and centuries previous were limited in size and effect since:

Only a small number of troops participated, thus there were low casualties.
Wars were not fully industrialized and thus less destructive.
Wars lasted weeks or maybe months (short), and involved only the professional soldiers fighting.
When it was over, the losers sat at the table with the winners and they came to terms - shifting territory and paying money.
Countries were not wiped out, casualties were maybe a couple of thousand soldiers - costs were "minimal". War was in fact an accepted part of diplomacy and pursuing national interest.

As a result of these expectations of what the *next* war would look like, no one in the early 1900's foresaw what a war between several fully industrialized countries would mean. In fact, to the degree that "experts" predicted what the next war would be like, many writing in the early 1900's theorized that widespread industrialization would shorten war - make it more condensed and quickly decided by the one with the most weapons and who mobilized fastest! Very few foresaw that massive armies with deadly weapons would in fact bog down into a bloody slaughter lasting over four years, killed millions and bankrupting almost every power that fought. The reality of 20^th century industrialized warfare was, simply, unimaginable.

Thus, when tensions did arise in the Balkans, there was not a strong attitude of avoiding war at all costs. Some European countries and citizens even wanted a war - which they thought would be short, they would win (nationalist pride!), and then they could grab more territory. Thus political and military leaders readily jumped into war when tensions escalated in 1914. This optimistic attitude about the outcome of war was quickly proven horribly wrong; dreams of a quick, noble victory were overwhelmed by the gruesome realities of the trenches in WWI. Of course, from the end of this "Great War", until today, fear of modern war and its costs remains a legacy for 20th and 21st century citizens.

So, as we head towards 1914, we leave Europe poised on the brink of war - nationalist passions aflame, alliances in place, building weapons in a frenzied arms race, military staffs planning war strategy based on the NEED for immediate mobilization, and with no one in power expressing any real fear of entering a war. Clearly, all that was needed to light the fuse and set in motion the myriad war plans and mobilizing armies was a spark - a spark which set fire to the tinderbox of the Balkans in Sarajevo. We pick up this story as we head into the disastrous era of the "Great War" in the next Unit.

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